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Abstract 
This paper argues that UK monetary policymakers did not respond to the inflation 
rate during most of the “Great Moderation” that ran from the early 1990s to the mid-
2000s.  We derive a generalisation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve in which 
inflation is a nonlinear function of the output gap and show that the optimal response 
of the policy rule to inflation depends on the slope of the Phillips curve; if this is flat, 
manipulation of aggregate demand through monetary policy does not affect inflation 
and so policymakers cannot affect inflation.  We estimate the monetary policy rules 
implied by a variety of alternative Phillips curves; our preferred model is based on a 
Phillips curve that is flat when output is close to equilibrium. We find that policy rates 
do not respond to inflation when the output gap is small, a situation that 
characterised most of the “great moderation” period.   
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1) Introduction 
This paper argues that the behaviour of monetary policymakers is more subtle 
and complex than implied by the simple monetary policy rules that are widely 
used in the literature. The response of policy rates to changes in inflation 
depends on the slope of the Phillips curve relationship that relates inflation to 
the level of output.   If, as many have argued, the Phillips curve is nonlinear, 
then the response of policy rates to inflation is not constant.  More radically, if 
the Phillips curve is flat, inflation is unresponsive to output.  In such regions, 
policy rates cannot affect inflation and it is therefore optimal for policymakers 
not to respond to inflation.  Policymakers exhibit the optimal neglect of 
inflation.  
Our evidence from UK data suggests that policy rates are unresponsive 
to inflation when the output gap is small but increasingly responsive as output 
moves away from equilibrium.  As a result, we argue, policymakers have not 
responded to inflation when output was within 0.25% of equilibrium, while the 
Taylor Principle that real policy rates should move in the same direction as 
inflation is only satisfied when the output gap is above 1%.   As the output gap 
widens, the effect of policy rates on inflation increases and so the response of 
policymakers is increasingly vigorous.  This implies a rather different account 
of UK monetary policy over the past fifteen years, as output was close to 
equilibrium for most of this period.   We identify a response of policy rates to 
inflation in 1993-4 and in 2000-1 only.  Policymakers therefore have neglected 
the inflation rate for most of the inflation-targeting period.  They have instead 
mainly responded to the output gap. 
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 The paper is structured as follows.  In section 2) we derive the optimal 
monetary policy rule when the Phillips curve is non-linear.   The standard 
model of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, as described in Gali et al (1999) 
derives a linear relationship between inflation and proportional movements in 
real marginal cost around steady-state.  A constant inter-temporal elasticity of 
elasticity labour supply function is then assumed, resulting in a proportional 
relationship between real marginal cost and the output gap.  This then gives 
the familiar linear relationship between inflation and the output gap.  We 
generalise this analysis by dropping the assumption of a constant inter-
temporal elasticity labour supply.  Doing so breaks the proportionality between 
movements in the output gap and real marginal cost and results in a nonlinear 
relationship between inflation and the output gap.   To derive a monetary 
policy rule, we assume policymakers choose the nominal interest in order to 
minimise a quadratic loss function taking into account the macroeconomic 
structure defined by the aggregate demand and Phillips curves.  This results 
in an optimal monetary policy rule that resembles the familiar Taylor rule, but 
where the response of policy rates to inflation is a function of the output gap; 
we argue that this interaction is a distinctive characteristic of the optimal policy 
rule with a non-linear Phillips curve. 
 In section 3), we consider the impact on monetary policy rules of the 
various Phillips curves that have been proposed in the literature.  Most studies 
use a convex or concave Phillips curve; since these are flat when there is a 
slump or a boom respectively, they imply that the response of policy rates to 
inflation will be highly cyclical (cf Dolado et al, 2004, and Kesriyeli et al 2006).  
We argue that these effects may well be difficult to detect in our sample 
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period, which covers the “Great Moderation” that ran from the early 1990s to 
the middle 2000s, when booms and slumps were largely avoided.  We also 
consider an alternative form of the Phillips Curve due to Solow (1969) in which 
inflation is highly sensitive to output in booms or slumps but unresponsive at 
other times.   This implies that the optimal response of policy rates to inflation 
would be small in periods of stability but large when output is more volatile, 
which would suggest a low response of policy rates to inflation during the 
great moderation.  We close this section by proposing a functional form for the 
Phillips curve that encompasses these cases and deriving the implied optimal 
policy rule. 
  In section 4) we outline our empirical methodology, explaining how we 
estimate policy rules for the alternative Phillips curve described above and 
how we confront the lack of identification of key parameters that bedevils work 
in this area.  We present our estimates in section 5).  We find that the data 
imply a policy rule consistent with a “Solow-type” Philips curve that is flat 
when output is close to equilibrium but which becomes steep as output moves 
away from equilibrium.  Section 6) discusses the implications of these 
estimates for UK monetary policy in recent years.  As discussed above, we 
suggest a different interpretation of recent policy decisions in which 
policymakers have largely neglected inflation.  Section 7) summarises and 
concludes.   
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2) The optimal monetary policy rule when the Phillips curve is nonlinear 
Our model is based closely on Gali (2008).  The representative household has 
the utility function 
 
(1)  0
0
( , )t t t
t
E U C Nβ∞
=
∑  
 
Where tC  is a consumption bundle defined as 
1
1 1
0
( ( ) )t tC C i di
ε
ε
ε
ε −
−
= ∫ , N  is hours 
of work and β  is the discount factor. Maximising tC  subject to the budget 
constraints 
1
1
0
( ) ( )t t t t t t tP i C i di Q B B W N−+ = +∫  , where ( )tP i  is the price of good i , 
B  are bond purchases, Q  is the price of bonds and W  is the wage rate, 
yields the demand functions 
 
(2)  ( )( ) ( )tt t
t
P iC i C
P
ε−= .   
 
where 
1
1
1
1
0
( ( ) )t tP C i
εε −−= ∫  is the aggregate price index.  With these, the budget 
constraint can be re-written as 1t t t t t t tPC Q B B W N−+ = + .   The optimal choice of 
consumption and hours of work to maximise (1) subject to this constraint 
satisfies  
 
(3)  ,
,
N t t
C t t
U W
U P
− = .   
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There is a continuum of firms who have the production function 
 
(4)  ( ) ( )t t tY i A N i=  
 
who each face the demand curve in (3).  Here we depart from Gali (2008) in 
assuming constant returns, for simplicity.  Following Calvo (1983), each firm 
can adjust price with fixed probability 1 θ− .  As is well-known (see, eg, Gali 
and Gertler, 1999), this model implies the following log-linearised Phillips 
curve relationship 
 
(5)  1
(1 )(1 ) ˆt t t tE mc
θ βθπ β π θ+
− −= +  
 
 
 
where mˆc  is the proportional deviation of aggregate real marginal cost from its 
steady-state value.   
 To derive a Phillips curve relationship between inflation and the output 
gap, we initially follow Gali (2008) in assuming  
 
(6)  
1 1
( , )
1 1
t t
t t
C NU C N
σ φ
σ φ
− +
= −− +  
  
In this case (3) simplifies to t t t tw p c nσ φ− = + , where a lower case variable 
denotes the natural logarithm of the corresponding upper case variable.  
Since the log of real marginal cost equals the log real wage less the log 
marginal product of labour and since consumption equals output, the log of 
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real marginal cost can be expressed as t t t tmc y n aσ φ= + − .    Using the 
argument in Gali (2008), p48), the proportional deviation of aggregate real 
marginal cost from its steady-state value can then be expressed as 
 
(7)  ˆ ( )( )sst t tmc y yσ φ= + −  
  
Where a superscript “ss” denotes steady-state values.   Substituting (7) into 
(5) we obtain the linear Phillips curve relationship   
 
(8)  1
(1 )(1 )( ) ˆt t t tE y
θ βθ σ φπ β π θ+
− − += +  
 
 
where ˆ sst ty y y= −  is the output gap (cf Gali, 2008, eqn 3.21).   
 It is worth noting that this derivation of a linear Phillips curve only holds 
in the special case of the constant intertemporal elasticity of labour supply 
assumed in the utility function in (6).  This ensures that variations in labour 
supply are proportional to variations in the real wage and hence that variations 
in output are proportional to variations in real marginal cost, allowing us to 
make the transition from the linear “marginal cost” Philips curve in (5) to the 
linear “output gap” Phillips curve in (8).  Aside from this special case, 
variations in output are not proportional to variations to marginal cost, implying 
that the ˆ tmc  term in (5) is in general a nonlinear function of the output gap.  As 
a result, the “marginal cost” Phillips curve in (5) will be linear but the “output 
gap” Phillips curve in (8) will in general be nonlinear. 
 The remainder of the section formalises this point.  Dropping the 
assumption of a constant inter-temporal elasticity we generalise (6) to be  
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(9)  
1
( , ) ( )
1
t
t t t
CU C N N
σ
φσ
−
= −−  
  
which implies that (3) becomes log '( )t t t tw p c Nσ φ− = +  and log real marginal 
cost is log '( )t t t tmc y N aσ φ= + − .  Using the argument on Gali (2008), p46), we 
can express the proportional deviation of aggregate real marginal cost from 
steady-state 
 
(10) ˆ ˆ( ) log '( ) log '( ) log '( ) log '( )ss ss sst t t t t t t tmc y y N N y N Nσ φ φ σ φ φ= − + − = + −  
  
Here mˆc  is not proportional to the output gap (other than in the special case 
of a constant elasticity labour supply curve, in which case (10) simplifies to 
(7)).  
 Since we are not assuming a simplifying special case, we have to use 
approximations in order to derive a more general relationship between mˆc  
and the output gap.  Denoting log '( )tNφ  by ( )tg N , noting ( ) ( / )t t tg N g Y A=  , 
assuming a steady-state value of TFP of unity (following  Blanchard and Gali, 
2008) and using the approximation ( / )t tg Y A ≈  2( ) '( ) ( 1) /t t t t tg Y g Y Y A A− −  gives 
 
 (11) 2
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( '( ) '( ) )ss ss ss sstt t t t t t t t t
t
Ag N g N g Y g Y a g Y Y g Y Y
A
−− − − −?   
 
Since the second term on the RHS is likely to be close to zero for all but large 
deviations of TFP from steady-state, we can simplify this as to be 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ss sst t t tg N g N g Y g Y− −? .  We can further approximate this as  
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(12) 21 ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) '( )( ) ''( )( ) ( )
2
ss ss ss
t t t ty y y yss ss ss
t t t t t t tg Y g Y g e g e g e y y g e y y h y− = − − + − =?   
 
Substituting (12) into (10) gives 
  
(13)  ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )t t t tmc y h y f yσ= + =  
 
 
In (13) mˆc is a nonlinear function of the output gap, reflecting the fact that 
variations in labour supply are not proportional to deviations in the real wage 
and hence in real marginal cost.   Substituting this into (5) gives  
 
(14)  1
(1 )(1 ) ˆ( )t t t tE f y
θ βθπ β π θ+
− −= +  
 
 
This is a generalisation of the well-known linear “output gap” Phillips curve in 
(8) in which the relationship between inflation and the output gap is nonlinear1 
(unless the inter-temporal elasticity of labour supply is constant, in which case 
(14) simplifies to (8)).   Both linear and non-linear forms of the Phillips curve 
share the “divine coincidence” that stabilising inflation is achieved by 
stabilising the output gap, a property highlighted by Blanchard and Gali 
(2007). 
As Gali (2008), pp48-9 discusses, the first-order condition for 
consumption from the model above implies that aggregate demand is given by 
the “dynamic IS curve”   
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(15)   1 1ˆ ˆ( )
d
t t t t t t ty i E E yρ π ρ ε+ += − − − + +  
  
where logi Q= −  is the nominal policy rate and logρ β= − . 
 We assume that policymakers choose the policy rate in order to 
minimise a loss function defined over inflation and the output gap and taking 
into account the macroeconomic structure defined by the aggregate demand 
relationship in (7) and the nonlinear Phillips curve relationship in (6).   We 
assume the per-period loss function is  
 
(16)  ( )2* 2 * 21 ˆ ( )
2 2 2t t t t
L y i iλ µπ π= − + + −  
 
where *π  is the inflation target or desired inflation rate, *i  is the equilibrium or 
desired policy rate and λ  and µ  are positive coefficients that capture the 
relative weights on output and policy rates in the loss function. This is a 
conventional quadratic loss function.  The first term expresses the loss from 
inflation as a quadratic function of the deviation of inflation from target, the 
second term expresses the loss from output as being quadratic in the output 
gap (both assumptions are standard, Clarida et al, 1999).  The final term in 
the loss function ensures that the policy rate equals the equilibrium value, 
given by * *i rπ= + , where r  is the equilibrium real policy rate, when inflation 
equals the target and the output gap is zero.   
                                                                                                                                            
1 There may be other ways of obtaining this result, for example, by using a model that uses union-firm 
bargaining or efficiency wages in place of labour market clearing (Blanchard and Gali, 2007, 2010). 
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Assuming that policymakers choose the nominal policy rate at the 
beginning of period t on the basis of information available at the end of period 
(t-1), their optimisation problem is  
 
(17)  { } 1
0
t
j
i t t j
j
Min E Lβ∞− +
=
∑  
 
Following the existing literature by solving this optimisation problem under 
discretion, the first-order condition is  
 
(18)  1
ˆ ˆ
0
ˆ ˆ
t t t t t t
t
t t t t t t
L d dy L dy LE
dy di y di i
π λ µπ−
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂+ + =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
 
 
Using the loss function and aggregate demand and Phillips curve 
relationships, the optimal monetary policy rule is 
 
 
(19)  ( )* *1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ'( )t t t t t ti i E y E f yρλ ργ π πµ µ− −= + + −  
 
where iˆ  is the optimal policy rate and (1 )(1 )θ βθγ θ
− −= .  This is the optimal 
monetary policy rule when the Phillips curve is nonlinear.  
The key feature of this policy rule is that the response of policy rates to 
inflation depends on the slope of the Phillips curve, given by ˆ'( )tf y .  The 
policy rule is a simple generalisation of the familiar Taylor rule, which is 
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obtained if the Phillips curve is linear, so ˆ'( )tf y  is a constant.  If the Phillips 
curve is flat, so ˆ'( ) 0tf y = , then the policy rate does not respond to inflation; 
therefore this policy rule exhibits the optimal neglect of inflation.  Of course, 
“optimal neglect” does not imply that policymakers are indifferent to inflation 
since the policy rule is driven by the desire to stabilise inflation.  It simply 
implies that the inflation gap in effect drops out of the optimal policy rule when 
the Phillips curve is flat, implying that the best way for policymakers to 
stabilise inflation is to stabilise the output gap. More generally, the response of 
monetary policy to deviations of inflation from the target is stronger when the 
Phillips curve is steeper, implying that a given change in the policy rate has a 
stronger impact on inflation.  We also note that the interaction between 
inflation and the output gap in (19) is a distinctive feature of policy rules when 
the Phillips curve is nonlinear.  In the literature, nonlinearity is often introduced 
by assuming non-quadratic terms in the loss function but assuming that the 
Phillips curve is linear (eg Nobay and Peel, 2003, and Surico, 2007).  To see 
the implications of this, we can express the loss function as 
 
(20)  ( )* * 2ˆ( ) ( )2t t y t tL L L y i iπ µπ π λ= − + + −  
 
where Lπ  and yL  capture the impact of inflation and the output gap 
respectively on the loss function.  If the slope of the Phillips curve is constant 
(given by φ ), then in this alternative model the optimal policy rule becomes 
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(21)  ( )* *1 1ˆ ˆ'( ) 't t y t t ti i E L y E Lπρλ ργφ π πµ µ− −= + + −  
 
where 'Lπ  and 'yL  are the first derivatives of their respective functions.  This 
loss function is nonlinear if Lπ  and yL  are not quadratic.  However it does not 
exhibit the interaction between inflation and the output gap that is in (19).  
That interaction term is therefore characteristic of a nonlinear Phillips curve2. 
 
3) The effect of specific nonlinear Phillips curves 
 Having derived the general optimal monetary policy rule, we consider 
the implications of nonlinear Phillips curves that have been proposed in the 
literature.  The most popular of these is a convex Phillips curve, first proposed 
by Turner (1995) and Laxton et al (1995).  Most existing models of monetary 
policy with a nonlinear Phillips curve consider this case (eg Dolado et al, 
2004, and Kesriyeli et al 2006).  The convex Phillips curve is depicted in figure 
1a), where it is apparent that inflation becomes highly sensitive to the output 
gap as output rises above equilibrium but that inflation and output become 
increasingly disconnected as output falls below equilibrium.  In terms of the 
model of section 2), this implies that the elasticity of labour supply is 
decreasing in employment, so increases in output require only small increases 
in the real wage when employment is low but imply sharply increasing real 
wages as employment rise above its steady-state level.  The implications of 
this for monetary policy are apparent from (11).  The response of the policy 
                                                 
2 Another consequence of a nonlinear Phillips curve is that policy rates may fall when inflation 
increases (cf Boinet and Martin, 2008)  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
13 
 
rate to the inflation gap (
( *)
t
t
di
d π π− ) depends on the slope of the Phillips 
curve.  When output is well below equilibrium, the Phillips curve is horizontal 
and so the policy rate does not respond to the inflation gap.  As output 
increases, the Phillips curve becomes steeper and so the policy rate becomes 
more responsive to the inflation gap.  As output rises well above equilibrium, 
the Phillips curve is steep and the policy rate is highly sensitive to the inflation 
gap.  In short, it is optimal for policymakers to respond strongly to the inflation 
gap in booms but to neglect this in slumps.  This is summarised in figure 1b) 
where the optimal response of the policy rate to the inflation gap is depicted 
as a function of the output gap. 
 An alternative form for the Phillips curve has been proposed by Stiglitz 
(1997) and Eisner (1997) who argue that the Phillips curve is concave.  As 
depicted in figure 1a) this is the polar opposite of the previous case, since 
inflation is now highly sensitive to the output gap when output is well below 
equilibrium and disconnected when output is well above equilibrium.  This 
implies that the labour supply elasticity is an increasing function of 
employment.  The optimal response of policymakers is therefore for the policy 
rate rates to be highly sensitive to the inflation gap in slumps but to neglect 
inflation in booms.  This response is shown in figure 1b). 
 These Phillips curves arguably have little relevance to monetary policy 
in recent years.   In both cases, the Phillips curve is approximately linear when 
output is close to equilibrium.  Since fluctuations in output have been small 
during the recent period of the “great moderation”, any variations in the slope 
of the Phillips curve have been small and so a constant response of the policy 
rate to the inflation gap has not been too far from optimal.   
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 However an alternative form of the Phillips curve implies that the 
stability of recent decades has increased the relevance of optimal neglect.  
Solow (1969) proposes an alternative form for the Phillips curve3 that is  
concave when the output gap is negative and convex when the output gap is 
positive (Dupasquier and Ricketts, 1998 consider a similar relationship while 
Filardo, 1998, considers related piece-wise linear Philips curve that is flat 
when the output gap is small).   This type of Philip curve is depicted in figure 
2a).  The Phillips curve is flat when output is in a zone close to equilibrium and 
has an increasing slope as output moves away from equilibrium. This type of 
Phillips Curve is implied by a labour supply function that is highly elastic when 
employment is close to its steady-state value but increasingly inelastic as 
employment moves away from steady-state in either direction (Solow uses an 
argument based on capacity utilisation in his derivation; eg Solow, 1969, pp 
10-12).   
The implied optimal response of the policy rate to the inflation gap 
(
( *)
t
t
di
d π π− ) is depicted in figure 2b).  When the output gap is small, the 
Phillips curve is horizontal.  This implies optimal neglect; the policy rate does 
not respond to the inflation gap as policymakers recognise that they cannot 
affect inflation through monetary policy.  As output moves further from 
equilibrium, in either direction, the slope of the Phillips curve increases and so 
the policy rate become more responsive to the inflation gap.  This type of 
Phillips curve implies that optimal neglect was been common during the 
period of recent period of unusual output stability.  Figure 2a) depicts two 
                                                 
3 We thank Adrian Winnett for suggesting this reference 
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alternative Phillips curves of this type.  The first is symmetric (specifically, it 
has rotational symmetry around the vertical axis).  This implies the same 
marginal response of the policy rate to the inflation gap when output is, for 
example, 2% below or 2% above equilibrium.   The other is asymmetric, 
allowing for different marginal responses depending on whether output is 
above or below equilibrium. 
 We close this section by proposing a flexible functional form for the 
Phillips curve that can capture these alternative cases, given by 
 
(22)  1 1( )
I
ty
I
t t
ef y y
φ
φ
ω
φ ω
− −=  
 
where φ  and ω   are parameters ( 0φ >  but ω  is unrestricted) and Iφ  is a 
positive-valued integer.  If 1Iφ =  the Phillips curve is 1( )
ty
t
ef y
ω
φ ω
−= , a 
functional form proposed by Nobay and Peel (2003).  The slope of the Philips 
curve is tyeωφ which implies that the monetary policy rule is  
 
(23)   ( )* *1 1ˆ tyt t t t ti i E y E eωρλ ργφ π πµ µ− −= + + −  
 
The Phillips curve in (23) is convex if 0ω > , in which case the marginal 
response of the policy rate to the inflation gap in (21) is also convex.  The 
Phillips curve is concave if 0ω <  in which case the response to inflation is  
concave.  A linear Philips curve is obtained when 1Iφ =  and 0ω → .  In that 
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case the slope simplifies to '( )tf y φ= ; substituting this into the policy rule in 
(21) we obtain the familiar linear Taylor rule 
 
(24)  ( )* *1 1tˆ t t t ti i E y Eρλ ργφ π πµ µ− −= + + −  
 
If 2Iφ = , the Phillips curve is 
2
1( )
ty
t t
ef y y
ω
φ ω
−= .  This is the symmetric 
relationship depicted in figure 2a).  The optimal policy rule is  
 
(25)   
2
2* 2 *
1 1
1ˆ ( 2 )( )
t
t
y
y
t t t t t t
ei i E y E y e
ω
ωρλ ργφ π πµ µ ω− −
−= + + + −  
 
If 3Iφ =  the Phillips curve is 
3
2 1( )
ty
t t
ef y y
ω
φ ω
−= , which is the asymmetric 
relationship depicted in figure 2a).  The optimal policy rule in this case is  
 
(26)   
3
3* 3 *
1 1
1ˆ (2 3 )( )
t
t
y
y
t t t t t t t
ei i E y E y y e
ω
ωρλ ργφ π πµ µ ω− −
−= + + + −  
 
The marginal responses of the policy rate to the inflation gap in these cases 
correspond to those shown in figure 2b).  In both cases, the policy rate is 
unresponsive to the inflation gap when output is close to equilibrium, rising as 
the output gap widens.  The policy rules in (25) and (26) are consistent with 
the symmetric and asymmetric responses respectively.   In the latter case, the 
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direction of the asymmetry is determined by the parameterω ; if this is 
positive, there is a stronger response when output is above equilibrium.  
 
 4) Empirical Methodology 
In this section we discuss how to estimate the parameters of the non-linear 
optimal monetary policy rule in (21) when the Phillips curve is given by the 
class of non-linear functions in (22).  Using (22), the policy rule can be written 
as 
 
(27) ( )2* *1 1 1ˆ (( 1) ))t Ity II I yt t t t t t tei i E y E y I I y eφ φφ φω ωφ φρλ ργφ π πµ µ ω−− − −= + + − + −  
 
This is an extended Taylor rule, where the response of the policy rate to the 
inflation gap is successively 1 t
y
tE e
ωργφ
µ − , 
2
22
1
1( 2 )
t
t
y
y
t t
eE y e
ω
ωργφ
µ ω−
− +  or 
3
33
1
1(2 3 )
t
t
y
y
t t t
eE y y e
ω
ωργφ
µ ω−
− +  when Iφ  equals 1, 2 or 3.   
 Our empirical strategy will be to estimate the policy rule in (27) for 
different values of Iφ  and assess which model provides the best empirical 
account of policymakers’ actions.  However it is apparent that many of the 
parameters in the policy rule are not identified, in particular, we cannot identify 
the parameter ω .   In order to identify this, we take a first order approximation 
of (18) around the point where 0ω = .  In doing so, we follow the approach of 
studies of non-quadratic preferences, that, in effect, approximate the nonlinear 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
18 
 
policy rule around the linear Taylor rule. Using the approximations 
1
I
t Iy
te y
φ φω ω+?  and 21
2
I
ty
I I
t t
e y y
φ
φ φ
ω ω
ω
− ≈ + and substituting into (19), we obtain 
 
 (28)  ( )
1 1
2 2 3 2* *
2 1 1
ˆ *
{ 2 1 ( ) (3 1) ( )}
2
t t t
I I
t t t t t t
i i E y
I E y I E yφ φφ φ
ω
ωω π π π π
−
− −
− −
= + +
− − + − −    
 
where 1
ρλω µ=  and 2
ργφω µ= .    
 We make two further refinements before estimation.  First, we use 
rational expectations, giving  
 
 (29)  ( )
1
2 2 3 2* *
2
ˆ *
{ 2 1 ( ) (3 1) ( )}
2
t t
I I
t t t t t
i i y
I y I yφ φφ φ
ω
ωω π π π π ε− −
= + +
− − + − − +  
 
where tε  captures the expectational errors induced by replacing the expected 
values of variables with actual values.  Second, we recognise that policy  
rates adjust slowly towards their optimal values (perhaps for reasons 
described in Woodford, 2003), so 1ˆ ˆ( ) (1 ( ))t t ti L i L iκ κ−= + −  where 
2
1 2 3( ) ...L L Lκ κ κ κ= + + +  is a polynomial in the lag operator L and  1κ , 2κ , etc   
are real-valued parameters.  Using this in (29) we obtain our empirical model 
as  
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(30)   ( )
1 1
2 2 3 2* *
2
( ) (1 ( ))( *
{ 2 1 ( ) (3 1) ( )} )
2
t t t
I I
t t t t t
i L i L i y
I y I yφ φφ φ
κ κ ω
ωω π π π π ε
−
− −
= + − + +
− − + − − +  
 
This is our empirical policy rule, which we estimate using GMM, exploiting the 
orthogonality condition in (28) 
The following section presents estimates of this non-linear monetary 
policy rule.  We do not attempt joint estimation of the policy rule with the non-
linear Phillips curve. The recent controversy on specification and in particular 
on the measurement of key variables in the literature on Phillips curves (cf 
Gali, Gertler, Lopez-Salido, 2001, 2005, Sbordone, 2002, 2005, Rudd and 
Whelan, 2005 and Linde, 2005) means this is beyond the scope of this paper.  
We discuss this issue further in section 6). 
 
5) Econometric Estimates 
In this section we present estimates of the optimal monetary policy rule in 
(30).  We use quarterly data for the UK for 1992Q4-2005Q1, covering both the 
“great moderation” period and the period of inflation targeting that began in 
late 1992.  The policy rate is the 3-month treasury bill rate; this is widely used 
in the literature because, as Nelson (2003) discusses, it is closely correlated 
with the various policy instruments used in recent decades.  We measure 
inflation as the annual change in the retail price index, following Kesriyeli et al 
(2006).  We model the output gap as the difference between real GDP and a 
Hodrick-Prescott trend of real GDP; this also follows Kesriyeli et al (2006).  
Other authors (eg Nelson, 2003) model the output gap using a quadratic trend 
rather than the Hodrick-Prescott filter; Mihailov (2005) concludes that this 
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makes little difference to estimates of Taylor rules in a UK context.  We find 
that inflation and the output gap are stationary but that the order of integration 
of the policy rate is more ambiguous; we assume that all variables are 
stationary (see Clarida et al, 1998 and Dolado et al, 2004 for a discussion of 
similar issues; also see Christensen and Neilsen, 2003, for a discussion of the 
difficulties encountered when estimating policy rules as a cointegrating 
relationship).    
 We begin with estimates of the simple Taylor rule, to provide 
comparability with the rest of the literature and to act as a baseline for 
estimates of our nonlinear models.  We use two lags of the policy rate.  We 
find Column (i) of table 1) presents estimates of the Taylor rule in (16).  We 
estimate that 1ω =1.17 and 2ω =2.17, indicating a much stronger weight on 
inflation than on the output gap.  These estimates are consistent with other 
recent estimates (Martin and Milas, 2004, Mihailov, 2005).  The Taylor rule 
assumes 1Iφ =  and 0ω → .  The estimates in column (ii) of table 1) also 
assume 1Iφ =  but allow ω  to be estimated from the data.   By doing so we 
impose that the response of the policy rate to the inflation gap is an 
asymmetric function of output but allow the data to determine whether this 
asymmetric response is convex or concave.  This model is not successful.  
Although the estimates of 1ω  and 2ω  are similar to those in column (i), the 
estimate of parameter ω  is not significant and the equation standard error is 
higher than in column (i).   This is perhaps not surprising.  As we noted above, 
this model assumes a Phillips curve that exhibits nonlinearity in either booms 
or slums but which is approximately linear at other times.  This type of model 
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is unlikely to be successful in our sample period, which covers the “great 
moderation”. 
 We next consider estimates of models based on a Philips curve that is 
flat when output is close to equilibrium.  Column (iii) of table 1) presents 
estimates of the model obtained when 2Iφ = .  This model requires that the 
response of policy rates to the inflation gap is a symmetric function of output 
in which the response is smallest when the output gap is small, but allows the 
data to determine how strongly policy rates respond to inflation when output is 
further from equilibrium. This model is also unsuccessful, having a higher 
standard error than the Taylor rule.   Column (iv) of table 1) presents 
estimates of the model obtained when 3Iφ = .  This model is successful, with a 
standard error markedly lower than in other models the Taylor rule.  We 
estimate 0.20ω = ; this implies that the Phillips curve is steeper, and thus that 
the response to inflation is stronger, when the output gap is positive.   
 The estimates in table 1) assume the policy rate responds to the 
contemporaneous values of inflation and output.  Since models exist in which 
policy rates respond instead to the expected inflation gap in the next period, 
we also estimated two further models.  The first is identical to (22) but where 
policy rates respond to the expected inflation rate one period ahead rather 
than to the contemporaneous inflation rate.  The second is identical to (22) but 
where policy rates respond to both the expected inflation rate and output gap 
one period ahead.  Estimates of these alternative models are presented in 
tables 2a) and 2b) respectively.  In each case, the estimates are similar to 
estimates of the comparable model in table 1) and the best fit is again 
obtained when 3Iφ = .  In each case, however, the estimates in table 1) have 
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a lower standard error.   Our preferred model is therefore that in column (iv) of 
table 1)4.  
 
6) Implications for UK monetary policy 
 Our estimates suggest that monetary policymakers in the UK have 
followed a more subtle policy rule than that implied by the Taylor rule.  The 
conclusion that the best model is obtained when 3Iφ =  implies that the 
response of policy rates to the inflation gap depends on output, being larger 
when output is further from equilibrium; the finding that 0.2ω =  implies an 
asymmetric response that is stronger when the output gap is positive.  Figure 
5) depicts the estimated response of policy rates to the inflation gap as a 
function of the output gap; this is obtained by calculating the value of 
'( )tf y
ργ
µ  for different values of the output gap, using the parameter estimates 
in column (iv) of table 1).  There is no response to inflation when output is 
between -0.25% and 0.2% of equilibrium.  The Taylor principle that policy 
rates should not accommodate inflation is only satisfied when the output gap 
is above 0.75% or below -0.85%.  The response to inflation increases sharply 
thereafter. 
 The implications of this for the policy rate are shown in figure 6).  This 
depicts the deviation of policy rates from equilibrium implied by the Taylor 
                                                 
4 The estimates in tables 1)-2) use a common instrument set.  To check the sensitivity of 
these estimates to the instruments, we found, using different instrument sets for each model, 
that estimates of models with 1Iφ =  and 2Iφ =  could be improved but that estimates for 
3Iφ =  remained superior.  It appears, therefore, that our estimates are robust to this. 
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rule, calculated as ( *)t
ργφ π πµ −   using the estimates in column (i) of table 1).   
The Taylor rule calls for constant adjustment of the policy rate but the larger 
adjustments include increases in 1992-4, 1995-9 and in 2003-4 and 
decreases in 1999-2003.  Figure 6) also depicts the deviation of policy rates 
from equilibrium implied by the estimates of our preferred zone-asymmetric 
model in column (iv) of table 1), calculated as *'( )( )t tf y
ργ π πµ − .   This model 
implies much less frequent adjustment of policy rates. There was no response 
to inflation for most of this period.  Policy rates deviated from equilibrium in 
two periods.  First, rates were substantially above equilibrium from early 1993 
to late 1994, when output was up to 2% below equilibrium and inflation was up 
to 3.5%.  Second, rates were up to 2% below equilibrium in 2000-1 when 
output was up to 1% above equilibrium and inflation was some way below the 
target.  However we note that although the deviation of inflation from the 
target in 1997-9 and in 2002-3 was at least as large as that in 2001, there was 
no response to inflation in these periods.  This is because the output gap was 
smaller in 1997-9 and 2002-3 than in 2000-1.  Our estimates imply that 
policymakers did not respond to these larger deviations of inflation from target 
because they recognised that they were unable to affect inflation while the 
economy was in a flat region of the Phillips curve and so inflation was 
unresponsive to aggregate demand. 
This evidence suggests that policymakers have been rather passive in 
their response to inflation for the past fifteen years.  In contrast to the constant 
adjustments to the policy rate that are implied by the Taylor rule, our preferred 
estimates suggest there was only an appreciable response to inflation when 
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deviations of inflation from the target coincided with output gaps of 1% or 
more.  This does not, however, imply that policymakers were inactive.  Rather, 
they attempted to keep inflation close to the target by keeping output as close 
as possible to equilibrium. 
 
7) Conclusions 
This paper has argued that the optimal response of the policy rate to the 
inflation gap is a function of the slope of the Phillips curve.  This implies that 
the response to the inflation gap is a function of the output gap if the Phillips 
curve is non-linear. Non-linear Phillips curves in the literature have regions 
that are flat; our analysis implies that policy rates do not respond to the 
inflation gap in these regions.  When estimated on UK data for the inflation 
targeting period that began in 1992, our model suggests that policymakers did 
not respond to the inflation gap because the economy was in a region where 
the Phillips curve was flat for most of this period. 
 Although we would argue that this analysis is interesting and plausible 
and produces new insights into monetary policymaking in this period, there is 
an obvious extension to the model.  We have not attempted joint estimation of 
non-linear monetary policy rule and a non-linear Phillips curve in this paper, 
arguing that the lack of consensus on specification and estimation in the 
literature on Phillips curves makes this beyond the scope of this paper.  We 
intend to return to this issue in future work. 
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Table 1 
 
GMM Estimates of Nonlinear Monetary Policy Rules 1992Q4-2005Q1 
 
( )
1 1 2 2 1 2 1
2 2 3 2* *
2
(1 )( *
{ 2 1 ( ) (3 1) ( )} )
2
t t t t
I I
t t t t t
i i i i y
I y I yφ φφ φ
κ κ κ κ ω
ωω π π π π ε
− −
− −
= + + − − + +
− − + − − +  
 
 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Taylor rule 
( 0φ →  
1Iφ = ) 
 
1Iφ =  2Iφ =   3Iφ =  
     
*i    5.372 (0.138)   5.261 (0.196)   5.189 (0.191)   5.393 (0.260) 
1ω    1.165 (0.349)   1.045 (0.278)   2.281 (0.567)   1.388 (0.434) 
2ω    2.169  (0.588)   2.091  (0.563)   2.320  (0.643)   0.342  (0.117)
ω   -0.288 (0.226)  -0.314 (0.023)   0.199 (0.023) 
2κ    1.306 (0.087)   1.314 (0.089)   1.206 (0.086)   1.276 (0.072) 
1κ   -0.522 (0.069)  -0.533 (0.057)  -0.401 (0.079)  -0.416 (0.080) 
     
R2  0.901  0.895  0.894  0.909 
s.e.  0.347  0.362  0.363  0.336 
J statistic  0.69  0.61  0.74    0.56 
het  0.46  0.08  0.40  0.58 
norm  0.86  0.30  0.86  0.84 
     
Notes: 
1) r is the 3-month treasury bill rate, π is the annual change in the retail price index and y 
is the proportional deviation of real GDP from a Hodrick-Prescott trend.  We assume 
π*=2.5% 
2) Standard errors are reported in parentheses  
3) In all columns, the instrument set comprises a constant and two lags of the policy rate 
and (π-π*) and four lags of y and y*(π-π*).   
4) The J-Statistic reports the p-value of Hansen’s test for the over-identifying restrictions 
5) Het reports the p-value for the White test for the null of no heteroskedasticity and 
norm reports the p-value of the Jarque-Bera test of the null of normality of the 
residuals 
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Table 2 
GMM Estimates of Nonlinear Monetary Policy Rules 1992Q4-2005Q1 
 
( )
1 1 2 2 1 2 1
2 2 3 2* *
2 1 1
(1 )( *
{ 2 1 ( ) (3 1) ( )} )
2
t t t t
I I
t t t t t
i i i i y
I y I yφ φφ φ
κ κ κ κ ω
ωω π π π π ε
− −
− −
+ +
= + + − − + +
− − + − − +  
 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Taylor rule 
( 0ω →  
1Iφ = ) 
 
1Iφ =  2Iφ =   3Iφ =  
     
*i    5.824 (0.136)   5.697 (0.185)   5.449 (0.363)   5.399 (0.211)
1ω    0.847 (0.289)   0.826 (0.278)   2.066 (0.704)   2.530 (0.742)
2ω    3.322 (0.708)   2.860 (0.563)   2.066 (0.704)   1.104 (0.266)
ω   -0.187 (0.218)  -0.330 (0.023)   0.177 (0.004)
2κ    1.101 (0.090)   1.133 (0.094)   1.185 (0.074)   1.225 (0.075)
1κ   -0.364 (0.049)  -0.394 (0.060)  -0.351 (0.054)  -0.373 (0.059)
     
R2  0.846  0.858  0.825  0.897 
s.e.  0.436  0.425  0.471  0.362 
J statistic  0.70  0.59  0.84    0.77 
het  0.02  0.01  0.07  0.41 
norm  0.62  0.30  0.80  0.90 
     
 
( )
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
2 2 3 2* *
2 1 1 1 1
(1 )( *
{ 2 1 ( ) (3 1) ( )} )
2
t t t t
I I
t t t t t
i i i i y
I y I yφ φφ φ
κ κ κ κ ω
ωω π π π π ε
− − +
− −
+ + + +
= + + − − + +
− − + − − +  
 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Taylor rule 
( 0ω →  
1Iφ = ) 
 
1Iφ =  2Iφ =   3Iφ =  
     
*i    5.125 (0.236)   5.300 (0.263)   5.398 (0.299)   5.501 (0.336)
1ω    2.519 (0.715)   0.602 (0.667)   4.680 (2.104)   4.529 (1.503)
2ω    3.319 (0.841)   3.449 (0.981)   6.663 (2.710)   1.870 (0.593)
φ   -0.297 (0.236)  -0.365 (0.022)   0.221 (0.008)
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2κ    1.003 (0.117)   1.068 (0.129)   1.190 (0.111)   1.255 (0.095)
1κ   -0.294 (0.106)  -0.346 (0.121)  -0.355 (0.112)  -0.402 (0.096)
  
R2  0.854  0.864  0.857  0.872 
s.e.  0.426  0.415  0.426  0.403 
J statistic  0.95  0.72  0.81  0.76 
Het  0.12  0.01  0.21  0.10 
Norm  0.22  0.63  0.75  0.77 
     
Notes: see Table 1) 
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Figure 1a)     Figure 1b) 
 
 
 
 
note:      note:  
“Linear Phillips curve” depicts the Phillips     this figure depicts the response of policy to inflation 
curve when  1Iφ =  and 0ω → .   didπ , implied by eqn (19). “Linear response to inflation
 “  
“Convex Phillips curve” depicts the Phillips   depicts this in the case where  1Iφ =  and 0ω →  
curve when  1Iφ =  and 0ω > .   “convex  response to inflation”  in the case where 
“Concave Phillips curve” depicts the Phillips  1Iφ =  and 0ω > and “concave  response to inflation”    
curve when  1Iφ =  and 0ω < .   in  the case where 1Iφ =  and 0ω <  
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Figure 2a)     Figure 2b) 
 
 
 
 
 
note:      note:  
“zone symmetric  Phillips curve” depicts the    this figure depicts the response of policy rates to inflation 
Phillips curve when 2Iφ = ;    didπ , implied by eqn (11). “Zone symmetric response to  
“zone asymmetric  Phillips curve”    inflation” depicts this in the case when 2Iφ =  
depicts the Phillips curve when 3Iφ =  “Zone asymmetric response to inflation” depicts this in the 
case when 3Iφ =  
 
 
 
Figure 3a)  
 
 
 
 
this figure depicts the response of policy rates to inflation,
di
dπ ,  
implied by eqn (11) using the parameters from column (iv) of table 1) 
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Figure 3b) 
 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
Linear response  Non linear response
 
 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
Output gap
 
 
notes: 
“Nonlinear response” depicts  the deviation of policy rates from equilibrium implied by the estimates 
of our preferred model in column (iv) of table 1), calculated as *'( )( )t tf y
ργ π πµ − ;  “Linear 
response” depicts the deviation of policy rates from equilibrium implied by the Taylor rule, calculated 
as *( )t
ργφ π πµ −  using the estimates in column (i) of table 1). 
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